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Recommended levels of antitobacco spending
have little effect on cigarette use.

Is the CDC
Blowing Smoke?
B Y M ICHAEL L. M ARLOW
California Polytechnic State University

I

n 2007, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (cdc)
released a report detailing “best
practice” spending recom
mendations for state tobacco
control programs. According
to the report, “Research shows
that the more states spend on compre
hensive tobacco control programs, the
greater the reductions in smoking — and
the longer states invest in such programs,
the greater and faster the impact.”
The cdc spending guidelines use
research to form “best practice” spend
ing recommendations for each state. The
report claims:
Implementing a comprehensive
tobacco control program structure
at the cdcrecommended levels of
investment would have a substan
tial impact. For example, if each
state sustained its recommended
level of funding for 5 years, an esti
mated 5 million fewer people in
this country would smoke. As a
result, hundreds of thousands of
premature tobaccorelated deaths
would be prevented. Longerterm
investments would have even
greater effects.
This claim should be met with skep
Michael L. Marlow is professor of economics in the
Orfalea College of Business at California Polytechnic
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ticism. At least four reasons suggest that
benefits from meeting spending targets
are not as large as the cdc argues:
The cdc recommendations draw
heavily on research from just two
states: California and
Massachusetts. Those two states
are considered models of effec
tive programs, in part, because
they have the longest funding
histories. Even if highly effective,
their success may not be easily
exported to other states.
■ The cdc ignores studies that
show little to no impact from
tobacco control programs.
■ There is evidence, again ignored
by the cdc, that little to no con
nection exists between state
spending on tobacco control and
the degree to which residents
smoke.
■ The cdc offers no empirical ver
ification that implementing rec
ommended spending targets
causes significant reductions in
tobacco use.
■

This article focuses on the last point
above. Empirical investigation of the
connection between spending guidelines
and tobacco use is conducted to direct
ly assess whether states that are closer to
cdc guidelines actually exhibit lower
tobacco sales than states that do not.

Analysis focuses on two related issues.
One is the fundamental question of
whether tobacco sales over 2000–2007
were influenced by spending on tobacco
control. The other is the policy ques
tion of whether meeting cdc spending
targets matters in efforts to reduce
tobacco sales.
TO BACCO CO N T RO L
L I T E R AT U R E

Studies of tobacco control programs
often focus on California and Massa
chusetts because of their long funding
histories. Tobacco control in California
began in 1988 when voters approved the
California Tobacco Tax and Health Pro
motion Act of 1988 (Proposition 99),
which increased the state surtax on cig
arettes by 25 cents per pack and ear
marked revenues for tobacco control pro
grams. In 1992, a Massachusetts ballot
initiative raised taxes 25 cents per pack,
with the resulting revenue to be used for
creation of the Massachusetts Tobacco
Control Program.
Some empirical studies have indicat
ed that the programs do indeed reduce
smoking. However, the studies’ reliabil
ity is unclear. A 2003 Journal of Health Eco
nomics paper by Matthew Farrelly et al.
points out that most studies simply per
form trend analysis on the introduction
of new tobacco control programs and
ignore other factors that might influ
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ence tobacco consumption. Those stud
ies also focus heavily on California or
Massachusetts. Even if their conclusions
are valid — that tobacco control pro
grams cause less smoking — it remains
unclear whether extrapolation to other
states is appropriate.
Early studies that control for one or
more factors outside of tobacco control
programs uniformly show that the pro
grams are highly effective in lowering
tobacco use. A 1995 American Economic
Review paper by T.W. Hu et al. controlled
for state excise taxes and tobacco firm
media expenditures and found that state
spending lowered consumption in Cal
ifornia. A 1995 Journal of Public Health
paper also by Hu et al. estimated that a
25 cent state tax hike reduced taxed sales
in California when measured over about
two years. Those two studies controlled
for effects of time on cigarette con
sumption, which may control for various
other factors — such as greater health
concerns — that affect smoking over
time. However, the Hu team’s studies

focus on California, the longestlived
state program, and examine effects on
taxed sales over very few and very early
years of a program that began in 1988.
The Farrelly paper examined tobac
co control activities of all 50 states and
concluded that state tobacco control
expenditures lowered taxed cigarette
sales over 1981–2000, after controlling
for excise taxes, smuggling, time, and
other statespecific factors. They also
estimated that aggregate cigarette sales
would have fallen by an additional 9
percent by 2000 if states had spent at
minimum funding levels advocated by
the cdc. A 2005 American Journal of
Public Health paper by John Tauras et al.
concluded that spending in the 50
states lowered youth smoking preva
lence and the number of cigarettes
smoked over 1991–2000, after control
ling for other factors that might also
influence sales.
The studies discussed so far exam
ined years in which many states did not
actively fund programs. The cdc only

began publishing funding data in 2000
because many states did not actively
fund programs until after the Master
Settlement Agreement in 1998. It
remains unclear whether the experience
of tobacco control programs prior to
when most states actively began funding
the programs easily translates into rec
ommendations for many states that only
began funding around 2000. It is also
unclear if experiences in the few states
with relatively long funding histories
easily convey to the many states without
such histories.
B EST P RACT I C ES
S P E N D I N G TA R G E T S

The cdc’s 2007 “best practices” report
claims that a range of $15 to $20 per capi
ta is a reasonable annual target for each
state to fund tobacco control activities.
Appropriate activities include antismok
ing ads, cessation interventions (inten
sive counseling services and cessation
medications), and enforcement of age
restrictions on the purchase of tobacco.
R EG U L AT I O N S U M M E R 2 0 0 9
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Ta b l e 1

Keeping Up With the CDC?
Annual state spending on tobacco
control for 2000–2007 as percentages
of cdc minimums

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Average
(percent)

Minimum
(percent)

Maximum
(percent)

7
48
96
82
57
54
5
56
26
30
77
11
30
64
36
4
15
25
139
67
56
0
94
108
0
35
35
30
14
42
35
45
19
27
73
25
31
49
25
5
15
0
9
44
68
40
68
41
45
41

1
17
66
0
45
16
0
0
1
5
39
5
13
31
26
3
9
2
123
30
7
0
65
0
0
4
3
22
0
23
16
31
0
0
35
8
14
0
10
0
8
0
5
39
57
32
45
38
32
12

22
77
132
103
82
110
19
119
56
49
95
17
71
101
49
6
23
42
168
99
136
0
122
165
0
74
53
33
28
67
56
89
40
38
97
46
53
80
33
8
31
0
12
47
82
57
82
42
68
80

Source: Campaign for TobaccoFree Kids, “History of State
Spending for Tobacco Prevention,” 2008.
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Table 1 displays how state spending
on tobacco control over 2000–2007 com
pared to cdcrecommended minimum
levels. Percentages of cdcminimum lev
els are shown. Two states — Maine and
Mississippi — averaged over 100 percent
over this period, and three states —
Michigan, Missouri, and Tennessee —
spent nothing. Table 2 displays total
spending in years 2000–2007 as well as
average percentages of cdc minimums
in each of those years. Total spending (in
2005 dollars) has been declining since
2003, and percent of cdc minimums
has ranged between 33.6 percent and
46.9 percent. Aggregate spending is $5.3
billion, which is roughly $18 per capita.
The cdc is thus arguing that states
should have spent at least $8 billion
more during those years, for a total of
$13.3 billion, to meet minimum recom
mended levels of funding. That works
out to roughly $44.30 per capita over
those years. The summary measures
appear to indicate ample variation with
which to assess cdc claims that consis
tent meeting of recommended spend
ing targets over time leads to significant
reduction in tobacco use.
As mentioned previously, the cdc
stresses the importance of maintaining
state funding over time at levels that
meet or exceed minimum targets. This
suggests that it takes many years of
tobacco control activity before full
effects of programs can be detected.
Spending is hypothesized to act as adver
tising: successful campaigns (in this case)
reduce demand both today and tomor
row. The Hu et al. American Economic
Review paper, the Farrelly et al. Journal of
Health Economics paper, and my 2006
Cato Journal paper each found some evi
dence that cumulative measures of
spending that discounted past spend
ing on tobacco control were associated
with less tobacco use.
This article employs discount rates
of 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent in its analy
sis of the effectiveness of the cdc rec
ommendations. This article also con
siders a cumulative measure of funding
adequacy as defined by how closely states
have met spending recommendations
over time. Table 3 displays cumulative
measures of tobacco control spending
(in 2005 dollars) per capita. Values are

Ta b l e 2

National Totals
Annual state tobacco control spending

2000

Total Spending
($2005)

Percent of CDC
Minimum

$771.3M

42.5

2001

813.1M

46.1

2002

814.0M

46.9

2003

715.9M

42.1

2004

561.3M

33.9

2005

538.2M

33.6

2006

533.9M

34.4

2007

562.6M

37.2

Source: Campaign for TobaccoFree Kids, “History of State
Spending for Tobacco Prevention,” 2008.

shown for 2007, and so values over
2000–2006 are included at discounted
rates. Average values are $19.53 and
$11.68 for discount rates of 5 and 20
percent, respectively. Table 4 displays
cumulative measures of funding ade
quacy, as defined as percentage of cdc
minimum spending targets, at discount
rates of 5 and 20 percent. Average values
are 274 percent and 167 percent for dis
count rates of 5 and 20 percent, respec
tively. Cumulative measures of funding
levels and adequacy thus range widely
across states throughout the period.
MODELING EFFECTS OF
TO BACCO CO N T RO L

Taxed sales of cigarettes are estimated
using a pooled and balanced regression
model over 2000–2007. A fixed effects
model is estimated to control for state
specific factors outside of the model.
Total sample size is 400 observations
and represents all states across the eight
year time period. The following rela
tionship for taxed cigarette sales is esti
mated:
CIGit = f(PRICEit , PCYit , UEit , BANit ,
SMUGit , CONTROLit )

The subscript i refers to the 50 states
and t refers to years 2000 to 2007. The
dependent variable CIGit is the number
of taxpaid percapita cigarette sales (in
packs) and is obtained from William
Orzechowski and Robert Walker’s 2008
monograph The Tax Burden of Tobacco.
The log of CIGit is examined, as is com

monly done, and allows direct estima
tion of the price elasticity of demand
because the log of the price variable is
included on the righthand side of the
equation. PRICEit is the price (in 2005
dollars) of a pack of cigarettes, as report
ed by Orzechowski and Walker, and is
hypothesized to be inversely related to
cigarette consumption.
Real percapita personal income PCYit
is obtained from U.S. Department of
Commerce data. The sign on PCYit is
ambiguous because, while cigarette
demand may be incomeelastic and there
fore exhibit a positive sign, higher income
may also lower sales given common per
ceptions that higherincome individuals
smoke less. Unemployment level UEit
controls for the state of the economy
and its sign is ambiguous as well because
it is unclear if high unemployment is
associated with more smoking from
greater emotional distress or less smok
ing from greater financial distress.
The smoking ban variable BANit con
trols for the effect of statewide smoking
bans in restaurants. Values of BANit are
set to 0 prior to bans and 1 thereafter to
capture effects on taxed sales. Data on
bans are obtained from a 2008 publica
tion by the group Americans for Non
smokers Rights. Some researchers have
found that smoking restrictions lead to
less smoking, which suggests that its
sign will be negative.
Taxpaid cigarette sales do not fully
ref lect instate consumption when
smokers purchase some portion of cig
arettes across state borders. SMUGit is
defined as the ratio of the ownstate
price to the average for bordering states
and is hypothesized to be inversely relat
ed to taxed sales because higher values
indicate higher incentives for crossbor
der smuggling. Values for Hawaii and
Alaska are set to 1 because they do not
border other states and so their smokers
are assumed to not purchase from other
states. Data are obtained from Orze
chowski and Walker (2008).
CONTROLit measures tobacco con
trol spending and is measured in two
alternative ways. The first measure is
spending (again, in 2005 dollars) per
capita (SPENDINGit) and the second is as
a percentage of cdc minimums (ADE
QUACYit). As discussed above, SPEND

Ta b l e 3

Ta b l e 4

PerCapita Spending

CDC Recommendations
and Total Spending

Discounted cumulative percapita
tobacco control spending, in 2005 dollars

Discounted cumulative measures of
funding adequacy as a percentage of
cdc minimum targets

Discount rates
5%

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

2.69
41.36
32.57
37.66
18.43
20.20
2.14
42.04
8.21
9.89
46.11
6.12
10.60
24.47
16.23
1.70
6.27
11.00
82.67
25.40
20.44
0
36.44
48.04
0
25.27
18.30
12.26
7.85
15.22
17.85
15.91
6.68
24.38
27.27
10.71
12.69
18.37
15.77
1.89
11.68
0
2.73
19.32
60.19
14.52
25.74
22.50
17.72
42.99

Percent of CDC recommendation
5% discount rate 20% discount rate

20%

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

1.08
28.41
18.37
24.02
10.57
13.58
1.13
33.18
3.43
4.85
27.41
3.51
5.27
12.16
9.13
1.14
3.28
7.40
48.32
13.58
8.86
0
20.29
24.66
0
17.94
9.45
7.27
3.12
8.00
11.96
10.76
5.20
17.10
16.38
7.24
6.46
12.04
8.80
1.01
6.15
0
1.50
11.74
35.05
8.49
16.51
13.49
9.51
31.79

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

41
335
637
566
379
376
33
418
159
190
514
74
193
408
236
25
98
176
924
435
342
0
615
694
0
251
225
202
83
274
244
314
139
189
487
171
200
340
162
31
98
0
56
300
451
267
469
276
295
297

17
236
378
369
224
263
18
333
68
96
315
44
98
208
137
17
53
120
555
240
151
0
353
364
0
183
120
126
33
148
168
217
110
134
300
119
105
226
92
18
53
0
32
190
269
160
310
169
163
224

Sources: Campaign for TobaccoFree Kids, “History of State Spending for Tobacco Prevention,” 2008; author’s calculations
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Ta b l e 5

CDC Recommendations and Cigarette Sales
Effects of spending and funding adequacy on the log of cigarette sales, with and
without instrumental variables
(1)

(2)

(3)

Instrument for
Spending

Real price per pack (PRICE )
Percapita income (PCY )
Unemployment (UE )
Statewide smoking
ban in restaurants (BAN )
Ratio of instate price to
border states’ prices (SMUG )
Real percapita spending on
tobacco control (SPENDING )
Tobacco control spending
as percentage of CDC
minimums (ADEQUACY )
Constant
Rsquared
Mean dependent variable
S.E. of regression
Fstatistic
Observations

**0.8430***
(10.35)
**3.2E05***
(7.64)
0.0037
(0.48)
0.0198
(1.12)
0.1863
(1.51)
***0.011495***
(4.72)

**0.8430***
(10.35)
**2.9E05***
(6.37)
0.0011
(0.14)
0.0249
(1.38)
*0.2148*
(1.70)
0.02778**
(2.17)

(4)
Instrument for
Adequacy

**0.8205***
(9.84)
**3.22E05***
(7.56)
0.0029
(0.39)
0.0238
(1.34)
*0.2286*
(1.84)

**0.8205***
(9.84)
**2.93E05***
(6.37)
0.0011
(0.14)
0.0249
(1.38)
*0.2148*
(1.70)

***0.0008***
3.98

**0.0022**
2.17

***10.39062***
(26.71)

***10.14091***
(24.82)

***10.3865***
(26.78)

***10.1327***
(24.74)

0.95
4.26
0.0805
146.07
400

0.95
4.26
0.0825
138.75
400

0.95
4.26
0.0812
143.40
400

0.95
4.26
0.0825
138.75
400

NOTES: *** significant 1% level (twotailed test); ** significant at 5 level; * significant as 10 percent level; tstatistics in parentheses

Ta b l e 6

Cumulative Tobacco Control Spending and Cigarette Sales
Effects of cumulative control spending on cigarette sales with
instrumental variable for spending

Real price per pack (PRICE )
Percapita income (PCY )
Unemployment (UE )
Statewide smoking
ban in restaurants (BAN )
Ratio of instate price to
border states’ prices (SMUG )

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

****0.8241***
(9.76)
****3.41E05***
(6.45)
0.0017
(0.21)
0.0289
(1.57)
*0.2244*
(1.76)

**0.8286***
(9.79)
**3.48E05***
(6.67)
0.0024
(0.29)
0.0296
(1.61)
*0.2269*
(1.78)

**0.8347***
(9.83)
**3.56E05***
(6.93)
0.0032
(0.40)
0.0302
(1.65)
*0.2268*
(1.78)

**0.8420***
(9.89)
**3.62E05***
(7.19)
0.0040
(0.50)
*0.0306*
(1.68)
*0.2248*
(1.77)

5%
Real percapita spending on
tobacco control (SPENDING )
Constant
Rsquared
Mean dependent variable
S.E. of regression
Fstatistic
Observations

0.0004
(0.50)
***10.4208***
(23.99)
0.95
4.26
0.0830
136.90
400

Discount Rate
10%
15%
0.0008
(0.79)
***10.4727***
(24.00)
0.95
4.26
0.0830
137.05
400

0.0014
(1.11)
***10.5321***
(24.06)
0.95
4.26
0.0829
137.30
400

20%
0.0022
(1.44)
***10.5940***
(24.17)
0.95
4.26
0.0815
137.65
400

NOTES: *** significant 1% level (twotailed test); ** significant at 5 level; * significant at 10 percent level; tstatistics in parentheses
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INGit is commonly used in the literature
and ADEQUACYit measures cdcdefined
funding adequacy. Data are obtained
from a 2008 publication by the group
Campaign for TobaccoFree Kids. Cumu
lative measures of these variables are
also examined to test whether differ
ences in funding levels exert lagged
effects on tobacco use over time and
across states.
If states with relatively few smokers
display less tolerance for smoking and
therefore spend more on tobacco control,
my econometric estimates of the effect of
tobacco control spending will be inac
curate. Instrumental variable estimation
is one method of dealing with this endo
geneity problem and involves selection of
a new variable that is both highly corre
lated with the independent variable in
question (tobacco control spending) and
also uncorrelated with all the other caus
es of smoking. Real state percapita
tobacco settlement funds MSAit are used
as an instrument for SPENDINGit and
ADEQUACYit because those funds should
influence funding availability, but it is
unlikely that those funds independent
ly influence cigarette sales. (As a check for
whether MSAit is a weak instrument, we
can determine whether the Fstatistic
exceeds 10 when testing the hypothesis
that coefficients on all instruments are
zero. In this case, the Fstatistic for
SPENDINGit was 18.1, and for ADEQUA
CYit was 19.50, indicating that MSAit is a
good instrument.) Settlement revenues
were based on a formula that included
smokingattributable state Medicaid
expenses and, while the agreement did
not dictate how funds were to be allo
cated, tobacco control advocates argued
that states should use those funds to sig
nificantly expand tobacco control spend
ing. Evidence, however, indicates that
those funds often go toward closing state
government deficits and costs associated
with general health care programs.
Tobacco settlement data are obtained
from Orzechowski and Walker’s book.
CONTEMPORANEOUS
S P E N D I N G A N D A D EQ UACY

Table 5 displays estimates of tobacco
control spending on cigarette sales.
Columns (1) and (2) display estimations
with and without instruments for tobac

co control spending, and columns (3)
and (4) display estimations with and
without instruments for adequacy. Price
coefficients, which measure price elas
ticities, lie between 0.82 and 0.84 and
are in line with the expectation that
demand for cigarettes is price inelastic.
Percapita income is found to exert neg
ative and significant influences on sales.
Unemployment and smoking ban vari
ables do not exert significant effects.
Smuggling is found to exert the hypoth
esized negative effect on sales in all esti
mations except in column (1). Coeffi
cients on both measures of tobacco
control spending are all positive and sig
nificant. Positive coefficients run count
er to cdc arguments that sales fall with
higher spending. The implication is that
higher contemporaneous spending rais
es cigarette sales, and this result is found
for estimations with and without instru
mental variables.
At least two possibilities might
explain positive coefficients on spending
and adequacy measures:
A “James Dean” effect might
exist whereby spending on tobac
co control raises social taboos
against smoking and then (per
versely) causes more smoking.
There is some evidence that this
happens with younger smokers
following the introduction of
smoking bans.
■ More likely, specification error
may exist when effects of spend
ing on sales are longerlived than
the contemporaneous relation in
Table 5. Tables 6 and 7 show
that cumulative effects of spend
ing and adequacy on sales are
estimated to be either negative
or zero, and so positive coeffi
cients in Table 5 are likely the
result of specification error.
■

It is also apparent that tvalues asso
ciated with spending and adequacy coef
ficients are lower in instrumental value
estimations. This commonly occurs
because standard errors are biased down
ward in ordinary least squares estima
tions when endogeneity is present. This
suggests that endogeneity is a problem
and so only instrumental variable esti
mation of cumulative effects from

Ta b l e 7

Cumulative Spending, CDC Recommendations,
and Cigarette Sales
Effects of cumulative adequacy on cigarette sales with instrumental variable
for adequacy of spending

Real price per pack (PRICE )
Percapita income (PCY )
Unemployment (UE )
Statewide smoking
ban in restaurants (BAN )
Ratio of instate price to
border states’ prices (SMUG )

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

**0.7956***
(9.47)
**2.61E05***
(5.03)
0.0044
(0.55)
0.0199
(1.09)
0.1933
(1.52)

**0.7939***
(9.40)
**2.72E05***
(5.28)
0.0040
(0.50)
0.0213
(1.16)
0.2027
(1.60)

**0.7941***
(9.34)
**2.82E05***
(5.56)
0.0034
(0.43)
0.0227
(1.24)
0.2106*
(1.66)

**0.7965***
(9.31)
**2.93E05***
(5.86)
0.0027
(0.34)
0.0240
(1.31)
*0.2163*
(1.71)

5%
Tobacco control spending
as percentage of CDC
minimums (ADEQUACY )
Constant
Rsquared
Mean dependent variable
S.E. of regression
Fstatistic
Observations

Discount Rate
10%
15%

20%

*0.0001**
(2.22)

*0.0001*
(1.94)

0.0001
(1.64)

0.0001
(1.30)

***9.9678***
(23.08)
0.95
4.26
0.0824
138.84
400

***9.9985***
(22.98)
0.95
4.26
0.0826
138.37
400

***10.0418***
(22.91)
0.95
4.26
0.0827
137.91
400

***10.0962***
(22.91)
0.95
4.26
0.0829
137.50
400

NOTES: *** significant 1% level (twotailed test); ** significant at 5 level; * significant at 10 percent level; tstatistics in parentheses

spending and adequacy are displayed in
the following tables.
S P E N D I N G A N D A D EQ UACY

Table 6 displays estimations of cumula
tive control spending on cigarette sales
with four alternative discount rates.
Prices and income exert significant and
negative effects in all four estimations,
and effects of unemployment and smok
ing bans (except in column 4 where it is
weakly significant and negative) cannot
be distinguished statistically from zero.
Smuggling exerts weakly significant and
negative effects in all estimations. Cumu
lative spending measures exert no sig
nificant effects on sales in all estima
tions. Again, evidence does not support
cdc claims that states that spend more
will also have less tobacco use.
Table 7 displays estimations based
on measures of cumulative spending
adequacy. Effects from price, income,
and unemployment mirror those of the
previous table. Although smoking bans
exerted negative and weakly significant

effects in one instance in the previous
table, it never exerts a significant effect
in Table 7. Smuggling exerts significant
and negative effects only when adequa
cy measures are discounted at 15 and
20 percent; it exerted negative effects in
all estimations of the previous table.
Spending adequacy exerts negative and
significant effects when discounted at 5
and 10 percent. No effects are found
when adequacy measures are discount
ed at 15 and 20 percent. Therefore, there
is some support for cdc claims con
cerning funding adequacy when this
measure is discounted at rates of 5 and
10 percent, but not at rates of 15 and 20
percent.
It is also worth noting that the effects
of funding adequacy discounted at a 5
percent rate are statistically significant at
the 95 percent confidence level, and at
the 90 percent confidence level when
funding adequacy is discounted at a 10
percent rate. In this loglinear specifica
tion, estimated coefficients of 0.0001
on funding adequacy at discount rates of
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5 and 10 percent can be interpreted as
unit changes in the cumulative value of
adequacy associated with a 100 * 0.0001
percent change in taxed cigarette sales.
Taxed sales fall by 0.011 percent for each
additional unit. Based on average taxed
sales in 2007 of 68 packs per capita, an
additional unit rise in ADEQUACY
would lower annual sales by 0.68 packs
per capita. This estimate suggests eco
nomic effects are trivial.
CO N C LUS I O N S

Empirical evidence does not generally
support the cdc claim that states that
spend more on tobacco control deter
more tobacco use than states that spend
less. Contemporaneous spending on
tobacco control is never found to exert
an inverse effect on sales, and at times is
found to exert a significant and posi
tive effect on sales, contrary to the claims
of the cdc. The true effect, however,
appears to be zero based on current and
past spending discounted at various
rates. There is limited support for cdc

claims regarding its recommendations
on funding adequacy when this spend
ing measure is discounted at rates of 5
and 10 percent, but not at rates of 15 and
20 percent. When significant, however,
these effects arise at fairly low levels of
confidence and with trivial effects on
cigarette sales, and therefore suggest very
cautious support for the cdc recom
mendations concerning adequacy. These
conclusions are based on a battery of
tests that consider various measures of
contemporaneous and past spending
and adequacy and are conducted over an
eightyear period in which over $5 billion
(in 2005 dollars), or roughly $18 per
capita, was spent on tobacco control.
This study raises questions about the
process by which the cdc determines
its spending recommendations and
whether the process is designed to reach
a particular conclusion about tobacco
control policy rather than to uncover
policies that may best allocate resources
toward controlling tobacco use. There
may be a similarity to what I noted in a

2008 Econ Journal Watch paper on why
the cdc and various researchers con
clude that indoor smoking bans exert
either positive or no adverse economic
effects on restaurants and bars when, in
fact, published studies demonstrate that
numbers of businesses harmed are not
zero. Factors include biases by govern
ments and researchers that favor gov
ernment solutions to perceived smoking
problems, ample funding for researchers
that conclude that bans exert no eco
nomic harm, simply ignoring industry
funded research that indicates some
degree of harm, and tacit agreement
between many researchers to not open
ly scrutinize the quality of colleagues’
published research on this topic. It
would be interesting to explore whether
any of those factors might be influenc
ing the policy process whereby the cdc
makes spending recommendations
regarding tobacco control. Those fac
tors might also explain why the cdc is
not compelled to demonstrate the effec
R
tiveness of its recommendations.
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